An edited version of this paper was published in the London Review of Books Vol. 28, No.

U.S. foreign policy shapes events in every corner of the globe. Nowhere is this

truer than in the Middle East, a region of recurring instability and enormous

strategic importance. Most recently, the Bush Administration’s attempt to

transform the region into a community of democracies has helped produce a

resilient insurgency in Iraq, a sharp rise in world oil prices, and terrorist

bombings in Madrid, London, and Amman. With so much at stake for so many,

all countries need to understand the forces that drive U.S. Middle East policy.

The U.S. national interest should be the primary object of American foreign

policy. For the past several decades, however, and especially since the Six Day

War in 1967, the centerpiece of U.S. Middle East policy has been its relationship

with Israel. The combination of unwavering U.S. support for Israel and the

related effort to spread democracy throughout the region has inflamed Arab and

Islamic opinion and jeopardized U.S. security.

This situation has no equal in American political history. Why has the United

States been willing to set aside its own security in order to advance the interests

of another state? One might assume that the bond between the two countries is

based on shared strategic interests or compelling moral imperatives. As we

show below, however, neither of those explanations can account for the

remarkable level of material and diplomatic support that the United States

provides to Israel.

Instead, the overall thrust of U.S. policy in the region is due almost entirely to

U.S. domestic politics, and especially to the activities of the "Israel Lobby." Other

special interest groups have managed to skew U.S. foreign policy in directions

they favored, but no lobby has managed to divert U.S. foreign policy as far from

what the American national interest would otherwise suggest, while

simultaneously convincing Americans that U.S. and Israeli interests are

In the pages that follow, we describe how the Lobby has accomplished this feat,

and how its activities have shaped America’s actions in this critical region.

Given the strategic importance of the Middle East and its potential impact on

others, both Americans and non-Americans need to understand and address the

Lobby’s influence on U.S. policy.

1

Some readers will find this analysis disturbing, but the facts recounted here are

not in serious dispute among scholars. Indeed, our account relies heavily on the

work of Israeli scholars and journalists, who deserve great credit for shedding

light on these issues. We also rely on evidence provided by respected Israeli and

international human rights organizations. Similarly, our claims about the

Lobby’s impact rely on testimony from the Lobby’s own members, as well as

testimony from politicians who have worked with them. Readers may reject our

conclusions, of course, but the evidence on which they rest is not controversial.

Since the October War in 1973, Washington has provided Israel with a level of

support dwarfing the amounts provided to any other state. It has been the

largest annual recipient of direct U.S. economic and military assistance since 1976

and the largest total recipient since World War II. Total direct U.S. aid to Israel

2

In addition, Washington provides Israel with consistent diplomatic support.

Since 1982, the United States has vetoed 32 United Nations Security Council

resolutions that were critical of Israel, a number greater than the combined total

The United States also comes to Israel’s rescue in wartime and takes its side

when negotiating peace. The Nixon Administration re-supplied Israel during the

October War and protected Israel from the threat of Soviet intervention.

Washington was deeply involved in the negotiations that ended that war as well

as the lengthy "step-by-step" process that followed, just as it played a key role in

As discussed below, Washington has given Israel wide latitude in dealing with

the occupied territories (the West Bank and Gaza Strip), even when its actions

were at odds with stated U.S. policy. Moreover, the Bush Administration’s

ambitious strategy to transform the Middle East—beginning with the invasion of

Iraq—is at least partly intended to improve Israel’s strategic situation. Apart

from wartime alliances, it is hard to think of another instance where one country

has provided another with a similar level of material and diplomatic support for

such an extended period. America’s support for Israel is, in short, unique.

This extraordinary generosity might be understandable if Israel were a vital

strategic asset or if there were a compelling moral case for sustained U.S.

backing. But neither rationale is convincing.

According to the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee’s (AIPAC) website,

"the United States and Israel have formed a unique partnership to meet the

growing strategic threats in the Middle East . . . . This cooperative effort provides

Backing Israel was not cheap, and it complicated America’s relations with the

Arab world. For example, the U.S. decision to give Israel $2.2 billion in

emergency military aid during the October War triggered an OPEC oil embargo

that inflicted considerable damage on Western economies. Moreover, Israel’s

military could not protect U.S. interests in the region. For example, the United

States could not rely on Israel when the Iranian Revolution in 1979 raised

concerns about the security of Persian Gulf oil supplies, and had to create its own

"Rapid Deployment Force" instead.

Even if Israel was a strategic asset during the Cold War, the first Gulf War (1990-

91) revealed that Israel was becoming a strategic burden. The United States

could not use Israeli bases during the war without rupturing the anti-Iraq

coalition, and it had to divert resources (e.g., Patriot missile batteries) to keep Tel

Aviv from doing anything that might fracture the alliance against Saddam.

History repeated itself in 2003: although Israel was eager for the United States to

attack Saddam, President Bush could not ask it to help without triggering Arab

Beginning in the 1990s, and especially after 9/11, U.S. support for Israel has been

justified by the claim that both states are threatened by terrorist groups

originating in the Arab or Muslim world, and by a set of "rogue states" that back

these groups and seek WMD. This rationale implies that Washington should

give Israel a free hand in dealing with the Palestinians and not press Israel to

make concessions until all Palestinian terrorists are imprisoned or dead. It also

implies that the United States should go after countries like the Islamic Republic

of Iran, Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, and Bashar al-Assad’s Syria. Israel is thus seen

as a crucial ally in the war on terror, because its enemies are America’s enemies.

This new rationale seems persuasive, but Israel is in fact a liability in the war on

terror and the broader effort to deal with rogue states.

4

To begin with, "terrorism" is a tactic employed by a wide array of political

groups; it is not a single unified adversary. The terrorist organizations that

threaten Israel (e.g., Hamas or Hezbollah) do not threaten the United States,

except when it intervenes against them (as in Lebanon in 1982). Moreover,

Palestinian terrorism is not random violence directed against Israel or "the

West"; it is largely a response to Israel’s prolonged campaign to colonize the

West Bank and Gaza Strip.

More importantly, saying that Israel and the United States are united by a shared

terrorist threat has the causal relationship backwards: rather, the United States

has a terrorism problem in good part because it is so closely allied with Israel,

not the other way around. U.S. support for Israel is not the only source of anti-

American terrorism, but it is an important one, and it makes winning the war on

Equally important, unconditional U.S. support for Israel makes it easier for

extremists like bin Laden to rally popular support and to attract recruits. Public

opinion polls confirm that Arab populations are deeply hostile to American

support for Israel, and the U.S. State Department’s Advisory Group on Public

Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim world found that "citizens in these

countries are genuinely distressed at the plight of the Palestinians and at the role

As for so-called rogue states in the Middle East, they are not a dire threat to vital

U.S. interests, apart from the U.S. commitment to Israel itself. Although the

United States does have a number of disagreements with these regimes,

Washington would not be nearly as worried about Iran, Ba’thist Iraq, or Syria

were it not so closely tied to Israel. Even if these states acquire nuclear

weapons—which is obviously not desirable—it would not be a strategic disaster

for the United States. Neither America nor Israel could be blackmailed by a

nuclear-armed rogue, because the blackmailer could not carry out the threat

without receiving overwhelming retaliation. The danger of a "nuclear handoff"

to terrorists is equally remote, because a rogue state could not be sure the

transfer would be undetected or that it would not be blamed and punished

afterwards.

5

Furthermore, the U.S. relationship with Israel actually makes it harder to deal

with these states. Israel’s nuclear arsenal is one reason why some of its

neighbors want nuclear weapons, and threatening these states with regime

change merely increases that desire. Yet Israel is not much of an asset when the

United States contemplates using force against these regimes, because it cannot

participate in the fight.

In short, treating Israel as America’s most important ally in the campaign against

terrorism and assorted Middle East dictatorships both exaggerates Israel’s ability

to help on these issues and ignores the ways that Israel’s policies make U.S.

efforts more difficult.

Unquestioned support for Israel also weakens the U.S. position outside the

Middle East. Foreign elites consistently view the United States as too supportive

of Israel, and think its tolerance of Israeli repression in the occupied territories is

A final reason to question Israel’s strategic value is that it does not act like a loyal

ally. Israeli officials frequently ignore U.S. requests and renege on promises

made to top U.S. leaders (including past pledges to halt settlement construction

Apart from its alleged strategic value, Israel’s backers also argue that it deserves

unqualified U.S. support because 1) it is weak and surrounded by enemies, 2) it

is a democracy, which is a morally preferable form of government; 3) the Jewish

people have suffered from past crimes and therefore deserve special treatment,

and 4) Israel’s conduct has been morally superior to its adversaries’ behavior.

On close inspection, however, each of these arguments is unpersuasive. There is

a strong moral case for supporting Israel’s existence, but that is not in jeopardy.

Viewed objectively, Israel’s past and present conduct offers no moral basis for

privileging it over the Palestinians.

Israel is often portrayed as weak and besieged, a Jewish David surrounded by a

hostile Arab Goliath. This image has been carefully nurtured by Israeli leaders

and sympathetic writers, but the opposite image is closer to the truth. Contrary

to popular belief, the Zionists had larger, better-equipped, and better-led forces

during the 1947-49 War of Independence and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) won

quick and easy victories against Egypt in 1956 and against Egypt, Jordan, and

American backing is often justified by the claim that Israel is a fellow-democracy

surrounded by hostile dictatorships. This rationale sounds convincing, but it

cannot account for the current level of U.S. support. After all, there are many

democracies around the world, but none receives the lavish support that Israel

does. The United States has overthrown democratic governments in the past and

supported dictators when this was thought to advance U.S. interests, and it has

good relations with a number of dictatorships today. Thus, being democratic

neither justifies nor explains America’s support for Israel.

The "shared democracy" rationale is also weakened by aspects of Israeli

democracy that are at odds with core American values. The United States is a

liberal democracy where people of any race, religion, or ethnicity are supposed

to enjoy equal rights. By contrast, Israel was explicitly founded as a Jewish state

Similarly, Israel does not permit Palestinians who marry Israeli citizens to

become citizens themselves, and does not give these spouses the right to live in

Israel. The Israeli human rights organization B’tselem called this restriction "a

A third moral justification is the history of Jewish suffering in the Christian West,

especially the tragic episode of the Holocaust. Because Jews were persecuted for

8

centuries and can only be safe in a Jewish homeland, many believe that Israel

deserves special treatment from the United States.

There is no question that Jews suffered greatly from the despicable legacy of anti-

Semitism, and that Israel’s creation was an appropriate response to a long record

of crimes. This history, as noted, provides a strong moral case for supporting

Israel’s existence. But the creation of Israel involved additional crimes against a

largely innocent third party: the Palestinians.

The history of these events is well-understood. When political Zionism began in

In 1893, for example, the Arabs comprised roughly 95 percent of the population,

and though under Ottoman control, they had been in continuous possession of

The mainstream Zionist leadership was not interested in establishing a bi-

national state or accepting a permanent partition of Palestine. The Zionist

leadership was sometimes willing to accept partition as a first step, but this was a

tactical maneuver and not their real objective. As David Ben-Gurion put it in the

late 1930s, "After the formation of a large army in the wake of the establishment

To achieve this goal, the Zionists had to expel large numbers of Arabs from the

territory that would eventually become Israel. There was simply no other way to

accomplish their objective. Ben-Gurion saw the problem clearly, writing in 1941

that "it is impossible to imagine general evacuation [of the Arab population]

This opportunity came in 1947-48, when Jewish forces drove up to 700,000

Since then, Israeli leaders have repeatedly sought to deny the Palestinians’

Europe’s crimes against the Jews provide a clear moral justification for Israel’s

right to exist. But Israel’s survival is not in doubt—even if some Islamic

extremists make outrageous and unrealistic references to "wiping it off the

map"—and the tragic history of the Jewish people does not obligate the United

States to help Israel no matter what it does today.

The final moral argument portrays Israel as a country that has sought peace at

every turn and showed great restraint even when provoked. The Arabs, by

contrast, are said to have acted with great wickedness. This narrative—which is

endlessly repeated by Israeli leaders and American apologists such as Alan

Furthermore, Israel’s subsequent conduct towards its Arab adversaries and its

Palestinian subjects has often been brutal, belying any claim to morally superior

conduct. Between 1949 and 1956, for example, Israeli security forces killed

between 2,700 and 5000 Arab infiltrators, the overwhelming majority of them

The IDF also murdered hundreds of Egyptian prisoners-of-war in both the 1956

Israeli personnel have tortured numerous Palestinian prisoners, systematically

humiliated and inconvenienced Palestinian civilians, and used force

indiscriminately against them on numerous occasions. During the First Intifida

(1987-1991), for example, the IDF distributed truncheons to its troops and

encouraged them to break the bones of Palestinian protestors. The Swedish

"Save the Children" organization estimated that "23,600 to 29,900 children

required medical treatment for their beating injuries in the first two years of the

intifida," with nearly one-third sustaining broken bones. Nearly one-third of the

Israel’s response to the Second Intifida (2000-2005) has been even more violent,

leading Ha’aretz to declare that "the IDF … is turning into a killing machine

Since then, Israel has killed 3.4 Palestinians for every Israeli lost, the majority of

whom have been innocent bystanders; the ratio of Palestinian to Israeli children

These facts about Israel’s conduct have been amply documented by numerous

human rights organizations—including prominent Israeli groups—and are not

disputed by fair-minded observers. And that is why four former officials of Shin

Bet (the Israeli domestic security organization) condemned Israel’s conduct

during the Second Intifada in November 2003. One of them declared "we are

behaving disgracefully," and another termed Israel’s conduct "patently

But isn’t Israel entitled to do whatever it takes to protect its citizens? Doesn’t the

unique evil of terrorism justify continued U.S. support, even if Israel often

responds harshly?

In fact, this argument is not a compelling moral justification either. Palestinians

have used terrorism against their Israeli occupiers, and their willingness to attack

innocent civilians is wrong. This behavior is not surprising, however, because

the Palestinians believe they have no other way to force Israeli concessions. As

former Prime Minister Barak once admitted, had he been born a Palestinian, he

Finally, we should not forget that the Zionists used terrorism when they were in

a similarly weak position and trying to obtain their own state. Between 1944 and

1947, several Zionist organizations used terrorist bombings to drive the British

Israeli terrorists also murdered U.N. mediator Count Folke Bernadotte in 1948,

12

Israel may not have acted worse than many other countries, but it clearly has not

acted any better. And if neither strategic nor moral arguments can account for

America’s support for Israel, how are we to explain it?

The explanation lies in the unmatched power of the Israel Lobby. Were it not for

the Lobby’s ability to manipulate the American political system, the relationship

between Israel and the United States would be far less intimate than it is today.

We use "the Lobby" as a convenient short-hand term for the loose coalition of

individuals and organizations who actively work to shape U.S. foreign policy in

a pro-Israel direction. Our use of this term is not meant to suggest that "the

Lobby" is a unified movement with a central leadership, or that individuals

within it do not disagree on certain issues

The core of the Lobby is comprised of American Jews who make a significant

effort in their daily lives to bend U.S. foreign policy so that it advances Israel’s

interests. Their activities go beyond merely voting for candidates who are pro-

Israel to include letter-writing, financial contributions, and supporting pro-Israel

organizations. But not all Jewish-Americans are part of the Lobby, because

Israel is not a salient issue for many of them. In a 2004 survey, for example,

roughly 36 percent of Jewish-Americans said they were either "not very" or "not

Jewish-Americans also differ on specific Israeli policies. Many of the key

organizations in the Lobby, like AIPAC and the Conference of Presidents of

Major Jewish Organizations (CPMJO), are run by hardliners who generally

supported the expansionist policies of Israel’s Likud Party, including its hostility

to the Oslo Peace Process. The bulk of U.S. Jewry, on the other hand, is more

favorably disposed to making concessions to the Palestinians, and a few

The Lobby also includes prominent Christian evangelicals like Gary Bauer, Jerry

Falwell, Ralph Reed, and Pat Robertson, as well as Dick Armey and Tom DeLay,

former majority leaders in the House of Representatives. They believe Israel’s

rebirth is part of Biblical prophecy, support its expansionist agenda, and think

The United States has a divided government that offers many ways to influence

the policy process. As a result, interest groups can shape policy in many

different ways—by lobbying elected representatives and members of the

executive branch, making campaign contributions, voting in elections, molding

public opinion, etc.

Furthermore, special interest groups enjoy disproportionate power when they

are committed to a particular issue and the bulk of the population is indifferent.

Policymakers will tend to accommodate those who care about the issue in

question, even if their numbers are small, confident that the rest of the

population will not penalize them.

The Israel Lobby’s power flows from its unmatched ability to play this game of

interest group politics. In its basic operations, it is no different from interest

groups like the Farm Lobby, steel and textile workers, and other ethnic lobbies.

What sets the Israel Lobby apart is its extraordinary effectiveness. But there is

nothing improper about American Jews and their Christian allies attempting to

sway U.S. policy towards Israel. The Lobby’s activities are not the sort of

conspiracy depicted in anti-Semitic tracts like the Protocols of the Elders of Zion.

For the most part, the individuals and groups that comprise the Lobby are doing

what other special interest groups do, just much better. Moreover, pro-Arab

interest groups are weak to non-existent, which makes the Lobby’s task even

The Lobby pursues two broad strategies to promote U.S. support for Israel. First,

it wields significant influence in Washington, pressuring both Congress and the

Executive branch to support Israel down the line. Whatever an individual

lawmaker or policymaker’s own views, the Lobby tries to make supporting Israel

the "smart" political choice.

Second, the Lobby strives to ensure that public discourse about Israel portrays it

in a positive light, by repeating myths about Israel and its founding and by

publicizing Israel’s side in the policy debates of the day. The goal is to prevent

critical commentary about Israel from getting a fair hearing in the political arena.

Controlling the debate is essential to guaranteeing U.S. support, because a

15

candid discussion of U.S.-Israeli relations might lead Americans to favor a

different policy.

A key pillar of the Lobby’s effectiveness is its influence in the U.S. Congress,

where Israel is virtually immune from criticism. This is in itself a remarkable

situation, because Congress almost never shies away from contentious issues.

Whether the issue is abortion, affirmative action, health care, or welfare, there is

certain to be a lively debate on Capitol Hill. Where Israel is concerned, however,

potential critics fall silent and there is hardly any debate at all.

One reason for the Lobby’s success with Congress is that some key members are

Christian Zionists like Dick Armey, who said in September 2002 that "My No. 1

It is AIPAC itself, however, that forms the core of the Lobby’s influence in

Congress. AIPAC’s success is due to its ability to reward legislators and

congressional candidates who support its agenda, and to punish those who

challenge it. Money is critical to U.S. elections (as the recent scandal over

lobbyist Jack Abramoff’s various shady dealings reminds us), and AIPAC makes

sure that its friends get strong financial support from the myriad pro-Israel

political action committees. Those seen as hostile to Israel, on the other hand,

can be sure that AIPAC will direct campaign contributions to their political

opponents. AIPAC also organizes letter-writing campaigns and encourages

newspaper editors to endorse pro-Israel candidates.

There is no doubt about the potency of these tactics. To take but one example, in

1984 AIPAC helped defeat Senator Charles Percy from Illinois, who, according to

one prominent Lobby figure, had "displayed insensitivity and even hostility to

16

our concerns." Thomas Dine, the head of AIPAC at the time, explained what

happened: "All the Jews in America, from coast to coast, gathered to oust Percy.

And the American politicians -- those who hold public positions now, and those

The Lobby also has significant leverage over the Executive branch. That power

derives in part from the influence Jewish voters have on presidential elections.

Despite their small numbers in the population (less than 3 percent), they make

large campaign donations to candidates from both parties. The Washington Post

once estimated that Democratic presidential candidates "depend on Jewish

This worry was absurd, however, because Dean is in fact quite hawkish on

These men were among President Clinton’s closest advisors at the Camp David

summit in July 2000. Although all three supported the Oslo peace process and

favored creation of a Palestinian state, they did so only within the limits of what

The situation is even more pronounced in the Bush Administration, whose ranks

include fervently pro-Israel individuals like Elliot Abrams, John Bolton, Douglas

Feith, I. Lewis ("Scooter") Libby, Richard Perle, Paul Wolfowitz, and David

Wurmser. As we shall see, these officials consistently pushed for policies

favored by Israel and backed by organizations in the Lobby.

In addition to influencing government policy directly, the Lobby strives to shape

public perceptions about Israel and the Middle East. It does not want an open

debate on issues involving Israel, because an open debate might cause Americans

to question the level of support that they currently provide. Accordingly, pro-

Israel organizations work hard to influence the media, think tanks, and

academia, because these institutions are critical in shaping popular opinion.

The Lobby’s perspective on Israel is widely reflected in the mainstream media in

good part because most American commentators are pro-Israel. The debate

among Middle East pundits, journalist Eric Alterman writes, is "dominated by

The media’s reporting of news events involving Israel is somewhat more even-

handed than editorial commentary is, in part because reporters strive to be

objective, but also because it is difficult to cover events in the occupied territories

without acknowledging Israel’s actual behavior. To discourage unfavorable

reporting on Israel, the Lobby organizes letter writing campaigns,

demonstrations, and boycotts against news outlets whose content it considers

anti-Israel. One CNN executive has said that he sometimes gets 6,000 e-mail

Pro-Israel forces predominate in U.S. think tanks, which play an important role

in shaping public debate as well as actual policy. The Lobby created its own

In fact, WINEP is funded and run by individuals who are deeply committed to

advancing Israel’s agenda.

The Lobby’s influence in the think tank world extends well beyond WINEP.

Over the past 25 years, pro-Israel forces have established a commanding

presence at the American Enterprise Institute, the Brookings Institution, the

20

Center for Security Policy, the Foreign Policy Research Institute, the Heritage

Foundation, the Hudson Institute, the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, and

the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA). These think tanks are

decidedly pro-Israel, and include few, if any, critics of U.S. support for the Jewish

state.

A good indicator of the Lobby’s influence in the think tank world is the evolution

of the Brookings Institution. For many years, its senior expert on Middle East

issues was William B. Quandt, a distinguished academic and former NSC official

with a well-deserved reputation for evenhandedness regarding the Arab-Israeli

conflict. Today, however, Brookings’s work on these issues is conducted

through its Saban Center for Middle East Studies, which is financed by Haim

The Lobby has had the most difficulty stifling debate about Israel on college

campuses, because academic freedom is a core value and because tenured

professors are hard to threaten or silence. Even so, there was only mild criticism

of Israel in the 1990s, when the Oslo peace process was underway. Criticism rose

after that process collapsed and Ariel Sharon came to power in early 2001, and it

became especially intense when the IDF re-occupied the West Bank in spring

2002 and employed massive force against the Second Intifada.

The Lobby moved aggressively to "take back the campuses." New groups

sprang up, like the Caravan for Democracy, which brought Israeli speakers to

The Lobby also monitors what professors write and teach. In September 2002,

for example, Martin Kramer and Daniel Pipes, two passionately pro-Israel

neoconservatives, established a website (Campus Watch) that posted dossiers on

21

suspect academics and encouraged students to report comments or behavior that

When Columbia recruited historian Rashid Khalidi from the University of

Chicago, Cole says that "the complaints started flowing in from people who

disagreed with the content of his political views." Princeton faced the same

problem a few years later when it considered wooing Khalidi away from

A classic illustration of the effort to police academia occurred in late 2004, when

the "David Project" produced a propaganda film alleging that faculty in

Columbia University’s Middle East studies program were anti-Semitic and were

In sum, the Lobby has gone to considerable lengths to insulate Israel from

criticism on college campuses. It has not been as successful in academia as it has

been on Capitol Hill, but it has worked hard to stifle criticism of Israel by

No discussion of how the Lobby operates would be complete without examining

one of its most powerful weapons: the charge of anti-Semitism. Anyone who

criticizes Israeli actions or says that pro-Israel groups have significant influence

over U.S. Middle East policy—an influence that AIPAC celebrates—stands a

good chance of getting labeled an anti-Semite. In fact, anyone who says that

there is an Israel Lobby runs the risk of being charged with anti-Semitism, even

though the Israeli media themselves refer to America’s "Jewish Lobby." In effect,

the Lobby boasts of its own power and then attacks anyone who calls attention to

it. This tactic is very effective, because anti-Semitism is loathsome and no

responsible person wants to be accused of it.

Europeans have been more willing than Americans to criticize Israeli policy in

recent years, which some attribute to a resurgence of anti-Semitism in Europe.

We are "getting to a point," the U.S. Ambassador to the European Union said in

Consider France, which pro-Israel forces often portray as the most anti-Semitic

state in Europe. A poll of French citizens in 2002 found that: 89 percent could

envisage living with a Jew; 97 percent believe making anti-Semitic graffiti is a

23

serious crime; 87 percent think attacks on French synagogues are scandalous;

and 85 percent of practicing French Catholics reject the charge that Jews have too

Finally, when a French Jew was brutally murdered last month by a Muslim gang,

tens of thousands of French demonstrators poured into the streets to condemn

anti-Semitism. Moreover, President Jacques Chirac and Prime Minister

Dominique de Villepin both attended the victim’s memorial service in a public

Critics are also accused of holding Israel to an unfair standard or questioning its

right to exist. But these are bogus charges too. Western critics of Israel hardly

ever question its right to exist. Instead, they question its behavior towards the

Palestinians, which is a legitimate criticism: Israelis question it themselves. Nor is

Israel being judged unfairly. Rather, Israeli treatment of the Palestinians elicits

criticism because it is contrary to widely-accepted human rights norms and

international law, as well as the principle of national self-determination. And it is

hardly the only state that has faced sharp criticism on these grounds.

In sum, other ethnic lobbies can only dream of having the political muscle that

pro-Israel organizations possess. The question, therefore, is what effect does the

Lobby have on U.S. foreign policy?

If the Lobby’s impact were confined to U.S. economic aid to Israel, its influence

might not be that worrisome. Foreign aid is valuable, but not as useful as having

the world’s only superpower bring its vast capabilities to bear on Israel’s behalf.

Accordingly, the Lobby has also sought to shape the core elements of U.S.

Middle East policy. In particular, it has worked successfully to convince

American leaders to back Israel’s continued repression of the Palestinians and to

take aim at Israel’s primary regional adversaries: Iran, Iraq, and Syria.

It is now largely forgotten, but in the fall of 2001, and especially in the spring of

2002, the Bush Administration tried to reduce anti-American sentiment in the

Arab world and undermine support for terrorist groups like al Qaeda, by halting

Israel’s expansionist policies in the occupied territories and advocating the

creation of a Palestinian state.

Bush had enormous potential leverage at his disposal. He could have threatened

to reduce U.S. economic and diplomatic support for Israel, and the American

people would almost certainly have supported him. A May 2003 poll reported

that over 60 percent of Americans were willing to withhold aid to Israel if it

resisted U.S. pressure to settle the conflict, and that number rose to 70 percent

25

Alarmed by these developments, Sharon accused Bush of trying "to appease the

Bush was reportedly furious at Sharon’s likening him to Neville Chamberlain,

and White House press secretary Ari Fleischer called Sharon’s remarks

The Lobby also went to work in Congress. On November 16, 89 senators sent

Bush a letter praising him for refusing to meet with Arafat, but also demanding

that the United States not restrain Israel from retaliating against the Palestinians

and insisting that the administration state publicly that it stood steadfastly

behind Israel. According to the New York Times, the letter "stemmed from a

meeting two weeks ago between leaders of the American Jewish community and

key senators," adding that AIPAC was "particularly active in providing advice

By late November, relations between Tel Aviv and Washington had improved

considerably. This was due in part to the Lobby’s efforts to bend U.S. policy in

Israel’s direction, but also to America’s initial victory in Afghanistan, which

26

reduced the perceived need for Arab support in dealing with al Qaeda. Sharon

visited the White House in early December and had a friendly meeting with

But trouble erupted again in April 2002, after the IDF launched Operation

Defensive Shield and resumed control of virtually all of the major Palestinian

Israel and the Lobby swung into action. A key target was Powell, who began

feeling intense heat from pro-Israel officials in Vice President Cheney’s office and

the Pentagon, as well as from neoconservative pundits like Robert Kagan and

William Kristol, who accused him of having "virtually obliterated the distinction

The first sign that Bush was caving came on April 11—only one week after he

told Sharon to withdraw his forces—when Ari Fleischer said the President

Powell lost.

In short, Sharon and the Lobby took on the President of the United States and

triumphed. Hemi Shalev, a journalist for the Israel newspaper Ma’ariv, reported

that Sharon’s aides "could not hide their satisfaction in view of Powell’s failure.

Sharon saw the white in President Bush’s eyes, they bragged, and the President

U.S. officials have offered mild criticisms of a few Israeli actions, but have done

little to help create a viable Palestinian state. Former national security advisor

Brent Scowcroft even declared in October 2004 that Sharon has President Bush